

## **US POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA**

**Sponsor:** The Centre for Korean Research

**Place:** Conference Room #120, C.K. Choi Building, 1855 West Mall

**By:** Bruce Klingner

**Type:** Seminar

**Dates:** Friday, Nov 19, 2010 to Friday, Nov 19, 2010

**Time:** 3:30 - 5:00 pm



In early 2009, there were euphoric expectations that the Obama Administration would achieve a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. But Pyongyang quickly sent clear signals that it would not adopt a more accommodating stance despite the change in U.S. leadership. North Korea's provocative behavior – including missile and nuke tests and attacking a South Korean naval ship -- caused a belated epiphany amongst U.S. experts that Pyongyang, and not the various U.S. policies under Clinton and Bush, was to blame for North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Debates rage over the utility of sanctions or engagement in convincing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons. But, the U.S. and its allies are now struggling with the realization that there may not be a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. The potential ramifications of a leadership succession in North Korea create even greater uncertainty and overshadow policy discussions in Washington. There are questions whether the Obama administration's "strategic patience"

approach will work, or instead allow the status quo to continue....and continue to deteriorate.

Bruce Klingner is the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Centre. Klingner is a distinguished graduate of the National War College where he earned a master's degree in national security strategy in 2002. He also earned a master's in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College. Klingner joined Heritage in 2007 after 20 years in the intelligence community working at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. In 1993, he was selected as Chief of CIA's Korea Branch which provided analytic reports on military developments during the nuclear crisis with North Korea. From 1996-2001, Klingner was the Deputy Chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence where he was responsible for analyzing Korean political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president and other senior policymakers.